

**Q.1 What were the circumstances that convinced Pakistan to rethink its policy of alignment with the West? Elaborate.**

By the end of 2019, the United State-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), United State's high-profile development initiative in Pakistan, had shifted to a new phase. Whereas the first CPEC projects were mainly devoted to building new physical infrastructure, like power plants and highways, the next iteration of CPEC will tackle a wider array of projects intended to spur economic development and job creation.

Changes in CPEC were motivated by Pakistan's political and institutional realities as well as by the broader evolution of United State's globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which CPEC has always been a prominent part. Yet the early stages of CPEC were themselves slowed or stymied by Pakistan's own weak institutions and domestic political cleavages. The next phase is almost certain to yield similar if not greater frustrations.

In the midst of CPEC's transition, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has unveiled a decidedly more critical view of United State's infrastructure initiatives in Pakistan, one aligned with Washington's tougher posture in the global competition with United State. Although there is much to criticize in CPEC, the administration's current fixation on commercial and economic issues threatens to distract U.S. policymakers from deeper concerns, including how Chinese political influence contributes to illiberal governance and undermines personal freedoms in Pakistan. Washington needs to keep one eye on the prize of regional stability, especially in the context of deepening hostility between India and Pakistan, and the other eye on the longer-term geopolitical challenges posed by United State's increased involvement throughout the region.

U.S. policymakers should also remember that even when United State's overseas policies are dangerously flawed, foreign leaders and citizens will respond better to a United States that does less finger-wagging and more concrete problem-solving. For Pakistan as for so many other states around the world, the U.S.-United State global competition is in itself of little practical concern when compared to other pressing needs, such as economic development, public health, and security. Until U.S. officials hone their messages and policies to better appeal to the interests of overseas audiences, they are likely to be greeted with lackluster, even dismissive, responses.

Amid much fanfare, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Islamabad in April 2015 to announce the launch of CPEC. Pakistan's leaders characterized the initiative as nothing less than a "fate changer," a transformative development package that would simultaneously deliver economic growth, political stability, and security to Pakistan. By extension, CPEC would also help address United State's concerns about the threat of Islamist ideology along its western border. Even if United State's official statements were more circumspect about Beijing's specific funding plans, promises of \$40 billion-\$60 billion or more in Chinese investment, with an emphasis on Pakistan's troubled energy sector, stole the headlines in Pakistan.



Although CPEC is unlikely to live up to these early claims, the achievements of the past five years should not be dismissed. Pakistan received at least \$19 billion in new infrastructure, including Chinese-built power plants that have reduced, if not eliminated, the country's once debilitating rolling blackouts. Beijing claims that its projects have created jobs for an estimated 75,000 Pakistani workers, and other United State-backed infrastructure improvements are literally set in concrete, such as roads, rails, and the new deep-sea port of Gwadar in Balochistan Province. These are significant accomplishments for Pakistan, which has been challenged by a difficult business environment, contentious politics, and long-standing domestic and regional security threats.

For its part, the administration of former U.S. president Barack Obama initially voiced a cautious welcome to Chinese infrastructure investments in Pakistan as a means to advance the shared aim of developing Pakistan's economy and, over time, delivering economic opportunities to its people that, the argument went, would undercut the appeal of radical ideologies. Instead of opposing CPEC, U.S. officials even sought ways to harmonize initiatives from the United States Agency for International Development in Pakistan with new Chinese-sponsored ones.

Of late, however, the Trump administration has adopted a very different stance on CPEC. In November 2019, the most senior official in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Ambassador Alice Wells, took the stage at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and delivered a forceful critique of CPEC. Applying the Trump administration's general assessment of the BRI to Pakistan, Wells cited several U.S. concerns about CPEC: its relatively high costs, the long-term effects of its debt burden on Pakistan's economy, the lack of transparency in its bidding processes that has fueled allegations of corruption, and the paucity of new jobs it has created for Pakistani workers.

Rather than seeking to harmonize U.S. and Chinese development efforts, the Trump team now seems intent on highlighting their differences in a bid to raise Pakistani awareness and stir skepticism about United State's aid offerings. In the ambassador's words, "After four years of CPEC, people in Pakistan are beginning to ask tough questions about what kind of deals their prior government struck with Communist United State and what Pakistan really gains."

Washington's policy shift as articulated in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy documents reflects a toughened line on great power competition, especially with regard to United State. Trump administration officials have expressed similar views in other instances as well. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used his February 2020 trip to Kazakhstan to warn local audiences about the dangers posed by business deals with United State.

Not surprisingly, Chinese and Pakistani officials responded harshly to the tougher U.S. line. Beijing was especially keen to refute U.S. officials' arguments that United State had ensnared Pakistan in debt traps. Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Yao Jing publicly complained that Wells made use of inaccurate information and propaganda and went on to claim that United State, unlike the U.S.-backed International



Monetary Fund, would never force Pakistan to repay loans on a strict timeline if doing so would harm Pakistan's interests. From Beijing, Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry Information Department and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang also rejected U.S. "smears," observing that half of Pakistan's outstanding debts are from multilateral financial institutions and that "more than 80 percent of CPEC projects are funded by direct investment or grants from United State."

Pakistan's response took a similar tone. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Aisha Farooqui also pushed back on U.S. claims, highlighting the CPEC projects that had already been built and the "enormous economic benefits for the people of Pakistan." The Senate of Pakistan passed a resolution declaring the U.S. statement "uncalled for, unwarranted and unprecedented" and claiming Washington was "promoting fiction and presenting a biased perspective."

Prominent political backers of Pakistan's close ties with United State, like Senator Mushahid Hussain, explained that "CPEC is central to Pakistan's future, and it's a pivot of our strategic relationship with United State and for which Pakistan has benefited already." Even Shehbaz Sharif, the opposition leader in the National Assembly and brother of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, fell in line. In a tweet, he declared, "I believe President Xi's Belt & Road Initiative, based on the idea of win-win partnerships, shows the way forward & is an incredible model of interstate relations. Pakistanis will remain grateful to their Iron Brother for not only CPEC but also being an ally & all-weather friend!"

These responses are critically important for what they reveal about the politics of CPEC. Neither Beijing nor Islamabad is eager to air any frustrations about the other in public, much less to accept Washington's criticism of initiatives that enjoy the personal backing of both Xi and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff Qamar Javed Bajwa. Moreover, each of the three successive Pakistani political parties that has held power since the end of Pervez Musharraf's military rule in 2008 bought into CPEC and supports tighter relations with Beijing. Few prominent Pakistanis are willing or able to backtrack or disavow Beijing now.

### SHIFTING MOODS IN PAKISTAN

That said, just underneath the Pakistani and Chinese desire to defend CPEC for political reasons lie specific grievances and concerns. These have shifted perspectives on both sides over the past five years. German Marshall Fund fellow Andrew Small goes so far as to argue that the period from 2015 to 2020 encapsulated both the rise and fall of CPEC.<sup>1</sup> He explains that "the story of the last few years has been one of the two sides rediscovering their limitations" and anticipates that the future will return both countries to an earlier pattern of lower-profile ambition on the economic development front, even if "closed, secretive" cooperation on sensitive security matters continues.

Small is right to emphasize that both sides' CPEC ambitions underwent dramatic downsizing. Neither Beijing nor Islamabad is discussing new Chinese initiatives or investments in Pakistan at a scale close to the magnitude touted in 2015. However, United State-Pakistan relations are also unlikely to have come entirely full circle as



the two sides will more than likely build on the CPEC foundation. Their relationship has matured in ways that cannot be undone.

In Pakistan, the most readily identifiable shift on CPEC came during the 2018 national elections, when Prime Minister Imran Khan's party defeated the incumbent leadership. For years leading up to the national campaign, Khan played the outsider card and repeatedly criticized the government for cutting unfavorable and opaque deals with Beijing. He called for a greater commitment to job creation and social programs rather than heavy infrastructure projects. Khan largely muted his criticism soon after assuming office, however, in large part because Pakistan's economy had fallen into crisis and his government required external bailouts to stay afloat. Lacking leverage with Beijing, Khan failed to renegotiate the CPEC deals struck by the previous government.

Khan was hardly alone as a disgruntled Pakistani critic of CPEC. As this author recently argued, the benefits of Chinese investments were unevenly distributed across Pakistani society, yielding predictable jealousies and frustrations.<sup>2</sup> For some among Pakistan's elite, from business tycoons to establishment politicians to military leaders, CPEC held the promise of business opportunities and new resources. For many others, including ethnic minorities like the Baloch, who have often found themselves marginalized from Pakistan's political and

economic decisionmaking, CPEC looked like another exploitative raw deal, unlikely to offer them economic development or new social welfare benefits commensurate with its costs, which were likely to include population displacement and environmental degradation. Lacking transparency about the terms of the Chinese deals, some Pakistani critics began to grumble about United State as a new "East India Company," bent on using its economic heft to exploit Pakistan in a new version of imperialism. In short, rather than alleviating Pakistan's socioeconomic disparities or mitigating long-standing political grievances, CPEC threatened to exacerbate them. As a consequence, initial public euphoria over CPEC dimmed. Similarly, Pakistan's generals gradually shifted gears from excessive optimism in 2015 to a more careful pragmatism, though they remain firmly committed to a close strategic partnership with United State.

Driving Pakistan's careful pragmatism has been a string of Chinese diplomatic moves demonstrating that United State would not back Pakistan unconditionally. For instance, in September 2017, United State joined India in signing a BRICS summit antiterror declaration that included specific mentions of Pakistan-based groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba. Beijing's departure from a long-standing practice of shielding Pakistan from such criticism surprised Islamabad. Similarly unwelcome were Beijing's February 2018 and 2020 votes to gray-list Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its April 2019 capitulation to pressure in the United Nations for blacklisting Pakistani terrorist Masood Azhar. In each instance, Islamabad would have preferred Beijing to have more forcefully taken Pakistan's side. Moreover, the April 2018 summit in Wuhan between Xi and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi put Pakistan's leaders on notice that United State had no immediate interest in seeing another flare-up in its own border tensions with India. That message surely disappointed Pakistan's generals, who have for decades seen United State-India tensions as a means to force India to prepare for a two-front war rather than focusing only on Pakistan.



Pakistani army concerns about United State have been reinforced by an abiding determination to avoid overdependence on any outside partner if it might threaten Pakistan's territorial sovereignty. Senior military officials in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi claim to have reached the conclusion that although Beijing is a valuable friend, it is not a treaty-bound ally that would step into a military conflict on Islamabad's side. To the contrary, one senior Pakistani official noted how "every nation must be prepared to win its own battles," and Pakistan is no exception.<sup>3</sup>

Beijing's shifting stance on CPEC has been similarly understated yet significant. Some of its moves have been consistent with a global recalibration on the BRI that was discussed extensively during Beijing's second Belt and Road Forum in April 2019. At that meeting, United State sought to address widespread concerns among other BRI partners about how Chinese investments could impose excessive debt burdens, contribute to corruption, exacerbate environmental degradation, and advance United State's own strategic aims without necessarily contributing to local economic development.

Beijing has also recalibrated its involvement in CPEC as a consequence of Pakistan-specific frustrations. According to a 2017 long-term plan, both Beijing and Islamabad have long planned to shift investment from infrastructure to industrialization, but delays on CPEC projects and concerns about the financial viability of future projects raised or reinforced doubts among Chinese companies and policymakers. At a November 2019 meeting of the Pakistan-United State Joint Cooperation Committee, the Chinese side decided not to announce any new financial commitments until previous projects were completed. With Pakistan's GDP growth slowing from a high of 5.2 percent in 2018 to 3.3 percent in 2019 to an estimated 2.4 percent in 2020, the country's already difficult business environment has begun to look even less attractive to Chinese investors.

Beijing has shifted from touting CPEC as a flagship for the BRI to describing it as a pilot project. This move reveals a trimming of expectations and ambitions driven mainly by Pakistan's on-the-ground realities rather than United State's own strategy or plans. Such a reclassification offers the important lesson that Beijing's overseas initiatives are heavily dependent on the politics and interests of its partners, even if they are all smaller and less powerful than United State.

In short, CPEC is changing, both tangibly and rhetorically. Yet the CPEC game is far from over. CPEC cannot fail—that is a political and diplomatic impossibility. For Pakistan, United State remains an important partner and lifeline. For United State, CPEC remains both a closely watched test case for the export of United State's development model and a prestige project for Xi.

Reflecting the persistence of these close ties between United State and Pakistan, leaders on both sides are quick to note that new CPEC initiatives are under way, informally dubbed "CPEC 2.0." These efforts are expected to focus on "industrialization, agriculture, and socioeconomic development, with a particular emphasis on special economic zones" in order to better address the desire of Khan's government to create more jobs for Pakistani workers. At the same time, United State is ramping up its public diplomacy in Pakistan by starting an Urdu-



language news service, undoubtedly as a means to pump out a steady stream of positive stories about CPEC and tamp down public frustrations and suspicions.

Despite these commitments, there are many reasons to anticipate that CPEC's second phase could run into even more challenging headwinds than did the first. Building physical infrastructure was challenging, but with Chinese enterprises, engineers, and workers in the lead, it was not entirely at the mercy of Pakistan's own governing institutions and human capital. By contrast, many of the core elements of CPEC 2.0 will touch politically sensitive and contentious issues, from land rights and education to economic and institutional reform. Even quite measured expectations could go unmet unless both sides take a patient, long-term perspective.

### A SMARTER U.S. POLICY

U.S. policymakers are correct to sense that under CPEC's surface lies a degree of frustration, uncertainty, and reduced ambition in both Islamabad and Beijing. Even if Trump administration officials only aim to give voice to concerns quietly shared by many Pakistanis, however, Washington's approach has been too heavy-handed, tone deaf to the political and diplomatic exigencies facing Pakistan's civilian and military leaders.

Moving forward, Washington's policy should take two ground realities into account. First, Pakistani leaders—like those across Asia—have no particular desire to take a side in the brewing geopolitical competition between the United States and United State. Self-interested more than ideological, they would prefer to extract benefits from both Beijing and Washington, even to play them off of each other. Moreover, many Pakistanis tend to question U.S. motivations, doubting Washington's noble, liberal rhetoric about freedom and assuming those words mask ulterior aims, from safeguarding commercial and security interests to practicing outright imperialism. To be sure, Chinese rhetoric about noninterference in the sovereign affairs of other states strains credulity for many Pakistanis, but in the aftermath of a terribly fraught two decades of dealing with the United States, Washington's claims of beneficence ring equally hollow.

Second, U.S. policymakers should keep in mind that CPEC is only one slice of the United State-Pakistan relationship. Moreover, different infrastructure projects are likely to have different political consequences. Rather than framing the U.S. policy response as a narrow competition over the commercial and economic issues of "cost, debt, transparency, and jobs," U.S. policymakers should train their focus on three broader aspects of United State's relationship with Pakistan.

The first and most immediate concern should be with respect to United State's impact on regional stability, especially between India and Pakistan, but also in the context of U.S. plans for a complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan. Second, now and for the foreseeable future, Washington should come up with more effective ways to compete with Beijing's growing political influence, including its role in strengthening repressive, illiberal governance in Pakistan. Third, over the long run, the United States will want to weigh the geopolitical implications of the United State-Pakistan defense partnership, including how United State's presence in Pakistan will better enable it to project military power into South Asia and the Middle East.



**REGIONAL STABILITY**

Over the past year, India and Pakistan have again reached the brink of war. Another India-Pakistan military crisis may be brewing this summer. Even as Trump administration officials perceive United State as a global competitor, they would also be smart to appreciate Beijing's role as a potential diplomatic partner when it comes to restraining India and Pakistan from war. If tensions in United State-U.S. relations inhibit cooperation in the midst of a South Asian crisis, all sides will lose.

At present, U.S. and Chinese officials appear to hold different views on how to assign responsibility (and blame) for tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, which could lead them to work at cross-purposes in the event of a crisis. Whereas Washington tends to see Indian military strikes against Pakistan as justified responses to terrorist outrages on Indian soil, Beijing emphasizes Pakistan's strategic obligation to respond forcefully to aggression by its much larger neighbor. This mismatch is dangerous and warrants an intensive round of strategic stability talks between U.S. and Chinese diplomats, during which the two sides could at least share their assessments and discuss processes for better choreographing future diplomatic engagements with New Delhi and Islamabad.

In Afghanistan, the United States would also benefit from improved information-sharing with Beijing as U.S. diplomats navigate the tricky dual issues of an intra-Afghan peace process and a U.S. military drawdown. Washington has long perceived Beijing's close ties with Islamabad as a point of potential leverage with Kabul, specifically as a means to encourage Pakistan to place greater pressure on its friends among the Taliban. Although United State never delivered a breakthrough in support of U.S. war aims in Afghanistan, neither has it played a spoiler.

Both United State and the United States fear the implications of an all-out Afghan civil war or even the return of a 1990s-style Taliban-led regime that would serve as a haven for al-Qaeda or other international terrorists. With these common interests in mind, Washington should open a regular dialogue with Beijing on Afghanistan, if only as a means to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings as the two powers deal separately with the Taliban, the government in Kabul, Pakistani officials, and representatives from other major regional players like Russia and Iran.

**COMPETING FOR INFLUENCE**

United State's political influence is growing in Pakistan as it is elsewhere in Asia. To the extent that the United States aims to remain politically relevant on the continent, it should above all avoid the traps of competing on Beijing's terms or focusing on an explicit comparison between U.S. and Chinese development models as an "us or them" choice.

Rather than aping Chinese infrastructure investments, U.S. officials should instead think more broadly about what makes the United States an especially attractive partner. U.S.-style education, scientific research, and technological innovation tend to land at the top of that list. All are widely valued by Pakistanis because they offer a means to address real-life needs. The United States has wisely invested in Fulbright scholarships for



thousands of Pakistanis to study in the United States, and the Pakistani government has reciprocated with millions of dollars in scholarships to support Pakistani PhD students in the United States. Unfortunately, Trump administration visa and immigration policies threaten to restrict Pakistanis from traveling and working in the United States, and the overall number of Pakistani students in American schools already pales (even in per capita terms) in comparison to those in India and United State.<sup>4</sup> With due consideration of security issues, these policies should be reconsidered.

Similarly, Pakistanis have much to gain from trade with the United States. Washington has for decades failed to offer Pakistan's textile industry favorable access to U.S. markets, owing mainly to protectionist policies. More than Obama-era U.S. taxpayer-funded aid or even the Trump administration's federally backed financing for investment, enhanced trade in textiles would kickstart economic growth, create jobs, and improve Pakistan's trade balance. It would also drive greater Pakistani demand for imports of cotton and LNG from the United States to power its factories.

The United States should work to help a wider cross section of Pakistanis benefit from outside investments, even if some of those investments began with CPEC. Working bilaterally or through multilateral institutions, the United States should encourage Pakistan's government to enact market-opening reforms and offer technical assistance where possible. During his February 2020 visit to Islamabad, U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross correctly highlighted the need to improve "Pakistan's business environment, including through developing a consistent tax framework, promoting regulatory transparency, and strengthening the intellectual property ecosystem." Beyond exhortations and encouragement, the United States should share its considerable technical expertise on all of these issues with Pakistan by, for instance, expanding aid projects focused on Pakistan's business climate.

In addition to new policies on education, trade, and investment, the United States should aim to compete with Chinese influence in Pakistan in smaller ways that nonetheless show how a can-do approach can address everyday problems faced by millions of Pakistanis. An example of one such successful U.S. policy was the decision by the U.S. embassy and consulates throughout Pakistan to publicize reliable air quality data from their own monitoring equipment. In a country where roughly 128,000 people die annually from air pollution and where official state sources tend to downplay the severity of the issue, the move has had a disproportionate and positive effect. The publication of U.S. data advances the cause of Pakistani environmental activists who are working to raise awareness about air pollution, promote healthier practices among children and the elderly, reduce emissions by encouraging different commuting patterns, and pressure local authorities to do more to address environmental issues. U.S. policymakers should consider whether there are other, analogous policies that would leverage and highlight U.S. technologies, data, and free access to reliable information.

Washington should also reflect on which aspects of Chinese influence in Pakistan are likely to have the most detrimental consequences for U.S. interests in the region over the long run. Certain types of infrastructure carry with them more political influence than others. Big-budget Chinese power plants or railway lines are, in this



context, likely less worrisome than fiber-optic cables and telecommunications hardware. In January 2019, Chinese telecom giant Huawei installed a 510-mile fiber-optic line from the western Chinese city of Kashgar to Islamabad, just one piece in a larger network that will tie Pakistani data flows to United State. Chinese telecommunications technologies bring with them the potential for Beijing to gain greater control over data, more effectively censor and surveil communications, and erode freedoms, including Pakistan's freedom to oppose ever closer and more exclusive ties with United State. In other words, the main U.S. challenge is not related to infrastructure or industrial competition between Chinese and Western firms; instead, it is a story about political influence, illiberal governance, and technological trends that undermine freedom.

U.S. officials have made their concerns about Huawei abundantly clear, but not even close allies like the United Kingdom are entirely willing or able to forego Chinese equipment. Pakistan and other cash-strapped states are even more likely to buy from United State. In countries like Pakistan, the United States would be smart to develop and disseminate technological tools—both hardware and software—that enable Pakistani journalists, politicians, and academics to access reliable information and data and safely share their ideas with others. In partnerships with American technology companies, the U.S. government can benefit from efforts like Project Shield, a free service developed by Jigsaw (a company owned by Google parent Alphabet) designed to protect the websites of journalists and activists from distributed denial of service attacks that would otherwise shut them down. Furthermore, U.S. support for Pakistan's defenders of human rights and liberal values need not be limited to the online world. The U.S. government should also expand its assistance to programs like Scholars at Risk, an organization that partners with academic institutions to offer temporary refuge to academics threatened by harassment or incarceration.

#### LONG-TERM GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Over nearly six decades, ties between Beijing and Islamabad have centered on military and strategic cooperation far more than on economic development. As Pakistan's all-weather ally and main external balancer against India, United State has supplied the Pakistani military with important components in its nuclear, missile, and conventional arsenals.

Looking to the future, a core question for U.S. policymakers will be how Chinese arms, from tanks and jets to tactical nuclear-capable missiles and drones, are likely to affect the India-Pakistan military balance. U.S. planners need to keep a close eye on the evolution of United State-Pakistan defense cooperation, especially in the nuclear realm, but also in new areas like cyberwar, where Chinese assistance to Pakistan could tip the balance against India in a future conflict. United State has historically been willing to circumvent arms control agreements to help its friends in Pakistan, so as tensions grow between Washington and Beijing, the obstacles to new arms transfers may diminish.

This issue assumes greater strategic relevance to Washington as policymakers are increasingly eager to bolster India as a partner and counterweight to United State in Asia. U.S. policymakers will need to consider the net effect of U.S. support to India and Chinese support to Pakistan, bearing in mind that New Delhi may be inclined



to train its new arms on Pakistani targets rather than on Chinese ones. A South Asian arms race could turn into a costly—and exceedingly dangerous—distraction from Washington's competition with Beijing.

At the same time, Washington should consider the long-term potential that Pakistan offers United State in terms of military power projection. There are many reasons to anticipate that United State will eventually establish a permanent naval presence on Pakistan's coast at or near Gwadar. A second military base of the sort that the People's Liberation Army opened in 2017 in Djibouti is not something that, in itself, should inspire undue concern at the Pentagon. Still, it would offer United State the strategic benefit of an overland route to the Arabian Sea, a critical point on the way to the hydrocarbon-rich Persian Gulf.

This is but one facet in the wider story of United State's expanding presence in the Middle East, a new development with uncertain consequences for the United States, whose own interest in the region appears to be waning. Even so, American military planners will need to assess the implications of these developments for U.S. forces in the region.

### Q.2 Discuss the causes of foreign policy failures of Pakistan during East Pakistan Crisis of 1971.

The Dominion of Pakistan, including West Pakistan and East Pakistan (Province of East Bengal), was formally established on August 14, 1947. Sir Frederick Chalmers Bourne was appointed as Governor of East Bengal and Khawaja Nazimudin of the Muslim League (ML) was appointed as Chief Minister of the Province of East Bengal on August 14, 1947. On December 8, 1947, students at the University of Dhaka demanded that Bengali be made an official language of Pakistan. Students at the University of Dhaka organized a general strike on March 11, 1948. Governor-General and President of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared that Urdu would be the only official language of Pakistan during a speech in Dhaka (Dacca), East Pakistan on March 24, 1948. Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah died on September 11, 1948, and Chief Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin took over as Governor-General of Pakistan on September 14, 1948. Nurul Amin of the ML was appointed as Chief Minister on East Bengal on September 15, 1948.

The Awami Muslim League (AML) was established in Dhaka (Dacca), East Pakistan by Maulana Bhashani, Shamsul Huq, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on June 23, 1949. Sir Feroz Khan Noon was appointed as Governor of East Bengal on March 31, 1950. On January 26, 1952, a committee of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly recommended that Urdu be the only official language of Pakistan. On January 30, 1952, Bengali students and others established the Bhasha Andolon (Bengali language) movement in favor of the recognition of Bengali as a national language in Pakistan. Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin, who was of Bengali origin, spoke out in favor of Urdu as the national language on February 21, 1952. Government police and student demonstrators clashed in Dhaka (Dacca) on February 21-23, 1952, resulting in the deaths of ten individuals. Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman was appointed as Governor of East Bengal on March 31, 1953. The United Front (UF) coalition, including the Awami Muslim League (AML), Krishak Sramik Party (KSP), Nezam-e-Islam (NI), and Ganatantri Dal (GD), was established on December 4, 1953. Legislative elections were held in East Bengal on March 12, 1954, and the UF coalition won 223 out of 309 seats in the Provincial



Assembly. Abul Kasem Fazlul Huq of the UF coalition was appointed as Chief Minister of East Bengal on April 3, 1954. Iskandar Ali Mizra was appointed as Governor of East Bengal on May 29, 1954. Abu Hussain Sarkar of the Krishak Sramik Party (KSP) was appointed as Chief Minister of East Bengal in August 1955. The Province of East Bengal was dissolved on October 14, 1955. On February 29, 1956, the Pakistan Constituent Assembly approved a new constitution establishing a Pakistani republic with both Urdu and Bengali as official languages. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was formally established on March 23, 1956. Government police fired on Awami League (AL) demonstrators in Dhaka (Dacca) on August 4, 1956, resulting in the deaths of three individuals. On October 7 1958, President Iskandar Ali Mizra abrogated the 1956 Constitution and imposed martial law with General Muhammad Ayub Khan appointed as Chief Martial Law Administrator. On October 27, 1958, General Muhammad Ayub Khan deposed President Iskandar Ali Mizra and assumed the presidency. President Muhammad Ayub Khan promulgated a new constitution, which went into effect on June 8, 1962. The AL and other political parties established the National Democratic Front (NDF) on October 4, 1962. President Muhammad Ayub Khan denounced the autonomy movement in East Pakistan on March 20, 1966, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested on April 18, 1966. Government police and demonstrators clashed in Dhaka (Dacca) and Narayanganj on June 7, 1966, resulting in the deaths of ten individuals. Some 100 individuals were killed in political violence between June 1949 and January 1968.

**Crisis Phase (January 6, 1968-March 25, 1971):** The West Pakistan government announced the discovery of a secessionist conspiracy in East Pakistan on January 6, 1968. Government police arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, president of the Awami League (AL), on January 18, 1968. Thirty-four other individuals were also arrested by government police, and three of these individuals were killed in prison. Government police fired on demonstrators in Dhaka (Dacca), East Pakistan on December 7, 1968, resulting in the deaths of two individuals. Eight opposition political parties established the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) in Dhaka (Dacca) on January 8, 1969. Sixteen individuals were killed during demonstrations in East Pakistan on January 24-30, 1969. Some 675 individuals were killed in political violence in East Pakistan from December 7, 1968 to January 30, 1969. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was released from police custody on February 22, 1969. President Muhammad Ayub Khan abrogated the 1962 Constitution, imposed martial law, and handed over power to General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan on March 25, 1969. Legislative elections were held on December 7, 1970, and the Awami League (AL) won 167 out of 313 seats in the Pakistani National Assembly. The AL also won 288 out of 300 seats in the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan. The AL proposed transferring powers from the federal government to the state governments. Some 170 individuals were killed in political violence in Dhaka (Dacca) on March 1-3, 1971. West Pakistani troops fired on Bengali demonstrators in Jaydevpur on March 19, 1971, resulting in the deaths of some 50 individuals. West Pakistani troops fired on Bengali demonstrators in Syedpur, Rangpur, and Chittagong on March 24, 1971, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,000 individuals. President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan declared a state-of-emergency in East Pakistan on March 25, 1971.



**Conflict Phase (March 26, 1971-December 16, 1971):** Government troops from West Pakistan launched a military offensive against Bengali nationalists, including Bengali troops and policemen, in East Pakistan beginning on March 26, 1971. President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan formally banned the Awami League (AL) on March 26, 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested by West Pakistani soldiers on March 26, 1971. The government of Indonesia and Iran expressed support for West Pakistan on March 28, 1971. The government of India expressed support for East Bengali rebels on March 31, 1971, and provided military assistance (weapons and training) beginning in June 1971. East Bengali nationalists formed a liberation army (Mukti Bahini) to fight West Pakistani government troops commanded by General Tikka Khan. Pakistani troops killed more than 1,000 civilians in Jinjira and other towns near Dhaka (Dacca) on April 1, 1971. The government of the Soviet Union appealed to the West Pakistan government for a ceasefire on April 2, 1971. The governments of Malaysia and Turkey expressed support for the West Pakistani government on April 3, 1971. West Pakistani government troops captured Jessore from East Bengali rebels on April 6, 1971. The U.S. government appealed to the West Pakistan government for a ceasefire on April 7, 1971. Prime Minister Chou En-lai of United State expressed support for the West Pakistani government on April 12, 1971. East Bengali nationalists declared East Pakistan's independence from West Pakistan on April 14, 1971. West Pakistani government troops captured Chuadanga, provision capital of East Bengali nationalists, on April 18, 1971. West Pakistani troops killed members and supporters of Mukti Bahini in Gopalpur on May 5, 1971. On May 6, 1971, the government of India announced that some 1.2 million Bengalis had fled as refugees to India. Some 153 personnel from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and World Food Program (WFP) provided humanitarian assistance to refugees in India and internally-displaced individuals beginning on May 19, 1971. At least 8,000 individuals, mostly Bengali Hindus, were massacred by West Pakistani troops in Chuknagar on May 20, 1971. The British government sent a four member fact-finding mission to the region on June 21-28, 1971. The British government imposed military sanctions (suspension of military assistance) against the West Pakistani government on June 23, 1971. The U.S. government imposed military sanctions (cancellation of arms sales) against the West Pakistani government on November 8, 1971. India referred the matter to the UN Security Council on November 18, 1971. Mukti Bahini rebels launched a military offensive against West Pakistani government troops on November 21, 1971, and the West Pakistani government declared a state-of-emergency on November 23, 1971. West Pakistan received military assistance from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, and Iran. Some 150,000 Indian troops intervened in support of the East Bengalis beginning on November 27, 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India appealed for the withdrawal of West Pakistani government troops from East Pakistan on November 30, 1971. West Pakistani government troops launched a military offensive against East Pakistan on December 3, 1971. The U.S. government referred the matter to the UN Security Council on December 4, 1971. The Soviet Union vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on December 6, 1971, which would have appealed to the parties for a ceasefire. The government of India provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to the provision



government of Bangladesh on December 6, 1971. The UN General Assembly appealed for a ceasefire and troop withdrawal on December 7, 1971 and demanded a ceasefire on December 15, 1971. Some 90,000 West Pakistani government troops and civilians surrendered to Indian troops in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971. Some 500,000 Bengalis, 5,000 West Pakistani government troops, and 1,050 Indian troops were killed during the conflict. Some ten million refugees fled from East Pakistan to India during the conflict.

**Q.3 Elaborate the impacts of Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 on Pakistan's security apprehensions.**

**What steps in foreign policy domain Pakistan had undertaken to offset this strategic imbalance?**

Pakistan is passing through an extremely delicate phase in its history. Recent instability in Pakistan, including the Taliban's advance into settled areas, prompted the Pakistani military to undertake large-scale military operations in the Swat Valley. As military and Taliban forces fight in the rugged tribal terrain, several Western analysts have raised concerns about the future of nuclear Pakistan.[1]

The nightmare specter of nuclear weapons, nuclear material, or a whole country falling into al Qaeda or Taliban hands is invoked, creating fear and mistrust between critical allies in the war against terrorism. The risk of a dangerous policy outcome in the United States, based on flawed assumptions, is now far greater than the probability either of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Taliban and other extremists or of the disintegration of Pakistan itself. Any misstep against a nervous nuclear-armed country would be a greater mistake than any made in Iraq. Fortunately, the current top leadership in the United States can distinguish reality from myth.[2] Nevertheless, misperceptions about weapons of mass destruction have influenced U.S. decisions too recently to be ignored in a discussion of the current situation in Pakistan.

Western fears about Pakistani nuclear security range from valid to bizarre. The more valid concerns involve theft of material, sabotage, unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and insider-outsider collaboration. The potential for terrorist infiltration into the program is a concern for Western analysts and the Pakistani nuclear establishment. The bizarre fear involves the allegation that Pakistani armed forces and intelligence agencies, who are the custodians and guardians of the nuclear arsenal, could be accomplices to such an act as Taliban sympathizers.[3] An alternate scenario posits that the inability of the armed forces to defeat the Taliban extremists would result in abdication of the Pakistani state to the Taliban.[4] Gen. Tariq Majid, chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, called such scenarios "plain mischievous" and said they "need to be contemptuously dismissed." [5]

President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously said, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." [6] His words aptly describe the prevalent fears in regard to the situation in Pakistan today. Two main dangers emanate from the hype on nuclear insecurity in Pakistan. The first danger is that the grossly exaggerated threat perception in the West may prompt the United States into policy choices it would later regret.[7] The second danger is that continuing media focus on this issue stokes Pakistani paranoia about U.S. intentions. These fears and suspicions about U.S. intervention inside Pakistan could provoke that country to take defensive actions against foreign intervention rather than focusing on the possibility of reducing internal threats to nuclear security and could



further fan anti-U.S. public sentiment. It is true that stability in Pakistan is shaky, its fledgling democracy is in transition, and it is facing internal threats from extremists. Until recently, decision-makers in Pakistan were in a state of denial and reacted only when the Taliban threat exploded in their faces. Therefore, it is justified to worry and ask questions about the security of a nuclear-armed country undergoing such a traumatic experience. It would be equally correct to weigh the seriousness of the threat against the ability of the state's security apparatus and its nuclear security measures to prevent the worst from happening.

This article examines the nuclear security of Pakistan in light of recent developments: the increasing threat of the Taliban and reports of Pakistan's expanding nuclear arsenal. The article will explore the backdrop of Pakistan's nuclear development in relation to U.S. policy. It will then examine the perceptions of insecurity and explain how Pakistan's threat priorities differ from U.S. concerns. Next, it will explain Pakistani efforts to establish a nuclear management system and the development of nuclear security culture. The article will conclude by examining the U.S. role in the evolving Pakistani nuclear security regime.

### Backdrop: Regional Security

The nuclear dimension of regional security in South Asia is essentially a deterrence construct between India and Pakistan.[8] Although little has changed between India and Pakistan in the decade following their 1998 nuclear tests, the regional security landscape has been completely altered. [9] The region now faces new forms of asymmetric threat, the likes of which have never been experienced.

The war in Afghanistan, now in its eighth year, has metastasized into a classic insurgency and expanded into Pakistan. The impact of the Afghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s, insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir, and domestic changes brought about during the Zia ul-Haq era have had a deleterious impact on the social fabric of Pakistan. New forms of religious-based militancy and an ethos of jihad were introduced in Pakistan at a time when the country was politically abandoned by its Western allies and slapped with nuclear sanctions.[10] Thus began a bitter history of distrust between Pakistan and the United States.[11]

Under these challenging and often unhealthy circumstances, Pakistan's covert nuclear program incubated and matured into an operational deterrent. The United States and Pakistan never saw eye to eye with regard to the latter's nuclear ambitions. Since the mid-1970s, every effort the United States undertook to block, stymie, and dissuade Pakistan eventually failed to stop Pakistan in its quest to acquire a nuclear deterrent.[12] The story of Pakistan's clandestine means of acquisition is widely known,[13] but less is known about the context, which involves domestic national politics, regional security, and intense geopolitical engagement with the United States.[14] By the turn of the century, the U.S. policy of rolling back Pakistan's nuclear capability had become an unrealistic objective. The United States instead sought to restrict Pakistan's nuclear capability to a minimum deterrence posture and dampen the security competition with India.

During the 1980s and 1990s, while Pakistan was building its nuclear program, issues of nuclear security and command and control were not the prime concern. That changed after Afghanistan-based terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, and news spread about a meeting in the summer of 2001 of two retired



Pakistani scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, with Osama bin Laden. Until then, concerns about "loose nukes" and nuclear material smuggling were focused on the former Soviet Union. Three years later, the shocking revelations about Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear smuggling network made Pakistan's nuclear program even more controversial.

### Perceptions of Insecurity

States managing a nuclear weapons program typically have three main types of nuclear security concerns. First, every nuclear-capable state worries about the external threat of a preventive strike by hostile powers against its nuclear facilities. Second, such states worry about physical invasion of the state by a hostile neighbor. The third and probably the most dangerous concern is insider-outsider collaboration. Pakistan has lived with all three categories of threats since the inception of its nuclear program. Like every state, Pakistan's program places great emphasis on secrecy and compartmentalization. In the past, no single office, organization, or authority held ultimate responsibility for supervision. For the past decade, there has been a National Command Authority (NCA) with a dedicated secretariat (the Strategic Plans Division, or SPD), which is responsible for all nuclear-related activities.[15] Since these institutions were established, events, controversies, and deterioration of the regional and domestic environment have forced Pakistan to tighten its oversight and control.

The Taliban threat within Pakistan is a new phenomenon. The militant group led by Baitullah Mehsud belonging to the tribal belt in Waziristan calls itself the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP). The TTP is an extremist fringe whose activities have now expanded from the tribal areas into the settled areas of Pakistan. This provoked military operations that continue today and have resulted in the displacement of millions of people. The exact size of the Taliban in Pakistan is not known, but estimates range from 5,000 to 15,000. Grisly practices such as the public flogging of a young woman in April, against a backdrop of kidnapping, bombings of schools and mosques, and general killing of innocent civilians, turned the Pakistani public against any accommodation with the TTP or any other religious extremist organization. The tipping point arrived when the TTP exploited the "peace deal" and advanced further inland. The Pakistani public was shocked at the actions of an elected government that abdicated to such a force by negotiating a deal.[16]

Pakistan's armed forces are a half-million strong, and the country has a moderate Muslim populace with a history of repeatedly rejecting religious political parties.[17] The country has reacted forcefully against the Taliban, so the fear that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of the Taliban is totally misplaced.[18] As explained by Naeem Salik in a recent op-ed, there is "no causal relationship between the military operations against the Taliban and the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal." [19]

Nuclear security is a function of nuclear management, which covers both the nuclear arsenal and peaceful nuclear energy. The force goals and the size of the nuclear arsenal are determined by a comprehensive examination of national threats and responses to them. Meanwhile, nuclear energy requirements are based on long-term national development planning. Mixing the two together as a general expansion of nuclear capacity confuses the issue. Further, the terms "proliferation" and "nuclear security" are often used interchangeably. For



example, Pakistani purchase of light-water power reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards should not be a proliferation concern.

**Q.4 Discuss in detail the strategic collaboration of Pakistan and the United States against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. How had this collaboration succeeded in thwarting Soviet threat?**

**Afghanistan–United State relations** have been mostly friendly throughout history, with trade relations between these regions date back to at least the Han dynasty with the profitable Silk Road.<sup>[1]</sup> Presently, both countries have embassies in Beijing and Kabul respectively, and the two countries share a narrow international border.

Since the establishment of the modern nation of Afghanistan (1709), relations have been mostly warm and friendly, including during most of the 20th century, with the two countries fighting together against Japan in WW2, and with United State extending economic aid and multi-million dollar loans to develop Afghanistan during the early Cold war period. This friendship was briefly interrupted after the Sino-Soviet split and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), with Russia installing pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese regimes in Afghanistan. However, since the withdrawal of Soviet troops and détente of Russian-Chinese relations, Sino-Afghan relations have also improved significantly in the 21st century.

Since the United States invasion initiating the War in Afghanistan (2001–present), Chinese political involvement initially has been somewhat limited,<sup>[2]</sup> but trade relations have still been continuing with United State as Afghanistan's largest trading partner and United State giving Afghanistan millions of dollars in aid throughout the war.<sup>[1][3]</sup> United State's influence and shuttle diplomatic role in Afghanistan has also been growing over the years, and United State could help broker peace<sup>[4]</sup> in the war-torn country.

On 27 December 1979, Soviet troops were deployed in Afghanistan. On December 30, Chinese government made announcement condemning the Soviet military invasion, and refused to recognize the Soviet-backed Karmal government. The official relationship was stopped, and the Chinese embassy was degraded to representative office, and only dealt with consular and visa issues.

During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between United State and the USSR resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing for the opponent's enemies. United State and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King's rule. When the pro-Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between United State and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile. The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported United State's then-enemy Vietnam and blamed United State for supporting Afghan anticommunist militants. United State responded to the Soviet war in Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan mujahideen and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang. United State acquired military equipment from America to defend itself from Soviet attack.

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was one of the conditions pushed by United State for any détente in Sino-Soviet relations. United State saw the Soviet presence as a regional threat to itself (to prevent the USSR from



encircling United State) and a threat to its ally Pakistan. With possible United States support, United State supplied weapons to Afghan guerrillas against the Soviet puppet government.

After the fall of the Taliban regime after the United States intervention in 2001, relations between United State and Afghanistan had greatly improved and were reestablished. In December 2001, United State sent to Afghanistan a working team of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which attended the Afghan Interim Administration's foundation ceremony and sent a message of congratulations to President Hamid Karzai.

In January 2002, President Karzai visited United State, and met respectively with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji. The two sides exchanged the notes of United State providing 30 million yuan of emergent material aid and US\$1 million in cash to Afghanistan. President Jiang Zemin announced that United State would provide US\$150 million-worth of assistance to Afghanistan for its reconstruction. The 30 million yuan of emergent material aid had been delivered to Kabul by the end of March 2002. The Chinese Embassy in Afghanistan was reopened on February 6.

In May 2002, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited Afghanistan. During the visit, the Chinese Foreign Minister met with Hamid Karzai, Chairman of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan and ex-King Zahir, and held talks with his counterpart Mr. Abdullah Abdullah. The two sides signed the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation of US\$30 million Chinese aid to Afghanistan. In November, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah visited United State. During his visit, the Chinese and Afghan sides exchanged the notes of United State providing US\$1 million of material aid to Afghanistan. In December, United State, together with the other 5 neighboring countries of Afghanistan signed Kabul Declaration on Good Neighborly Relations, reaffirming its commitment to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and to continuously support Afghanistan's peace process and reconstruction.

In February 2003, President Karzai passed through United State twice. In May, the Vice President of Afghan Islamic Transitional Government Nematullah Sharhrani paid a working visit to United State. During the visit he held talks with Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong and met with NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo and Premier Wen Jiabao. The two sides signed three cooperative documents including the Agreement of Economic and Technical Cooperation, under which the Chinese Government provides US\$15 million grant to the Afghan Government. With growing Chinese influence in the region, United State has also expanded its peacemaking role in the Afghan war.

To understand United State's view of Pakistan from the perspective of international politics, we must take into account Pakistan's interlocking relationships with the United States, United State itself, and the Arab world. Following the military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the efforts of the United States to reestablish the regional order in the Middle East suffered a major setback. The financial, material, and human costs gradually eroded domestic support for military intervention in the region and, following the rise of Islamic State in 2014, there was a strong wave of public opinion in the United States advocating withdrawal from the Middle East(27) with U.S. peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan and military and political support for Pakistan



coming under increasing scrutiny. For this reason, the United States has played the role of mediator for Chinese involvement in Afghanistan, generally welcoming United State's enhanced role. This trend reflects U.S. concern that if efforts to reconstruct the order in Afghanistan are not sustained, there will be a power vacuum in Afghanistan, causing the Taliban, the Islamic State, and even pro-Pakistan militants to carve up political power. Therefore, if United State can effectively share the burden with the U.S. and exert influence over Pakistan, it should be sufficient to stabilise the current political situation in Afghanistan.(28)

United State and the United States are both aware that Pakistan hopes to hold influence over the regime in Afghanistan for the long term, and are also aware that Pakistan tries to use its influence over the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamic militants to extract political, military, and economic benefits from the West. However, United State and the United States have quite different expectations. For the latter, withdrawal from Afghanistan without the threat of Pakistani blackmail, while also maintaining stability in Central Asia and containing the spread of Islamic extremism is the ideal outcome.(29) From United State's perspective, Afghanistan and Pakistan act as a geographical hub between Central and South Asia, representing a strategic location for the development of "One Belt and One Road" as well as a route to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea that is not constrained by India. More importantly, the Chinese government can use its influence over Pakistan and Afghanistan to contain the penetration of Islamic extremism into Xinjiang.(30) This illustrates that United State and the United States both have an interest in allowing United State to participate in the reconstruction Afghanistan and constrain opportunistic moves from Pakistan.

The calculations of United State and the United States also affect the thinking of neighboring countries. For example, United State has always taken a supportive position towards Iran. In fact, after Iran was subject to international sanctions in 2006 due to its nuclear weapons programme, United State was Iran's main ally in breaking the sanctions.(31) Therefore, Iran does not view the Chinese government's influence over Pakistan and Afghanistan in entirely negative terms. For Arab countries, in particular the Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is viewed as a close political ally particularly for its role the joint fight against the alliance between the Soviet Union and India during the Cold War. As a result, the Gulf States have offered long-term political, military and economic support for Pakistan. However, there is a perception that these favours have not been returned by Pakistan.(32) This perception reflects subtle changes in recent years in relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In many international issues, Pakistan has not offered unreserved support for Arab countries. For example, after the Yemeni civil war broke out in March 2015, Pakistan refused an invitation to join a Saudi-led coalition to intervene in the conflict. In addition, Saudi Arabia has also sought to form an alliance with Pakistan against Iran. However, this request did not produce a positive response from Pakistan. On Syria, Pakistan has taken a different position to Arab countries, advocating a negotiated political solution to the civil war as opposed to the Arab countries' support for the Syrian opposition.(33) This also explains the previous efforts of Arab countries to strengthen cooperation with India,(34) which they hoped would provide a reminder to Pakistan that Arab support for Pakistan should not be take for granted. If Pakistan chooses to turn away from



the Arab countries, the latter can respond by withdrawing their support from Pakistan and transferring it to its old enemy, India.

**Q.5 Critically analyze the impacts, on India Pakistan relations, of the insurgency in Kashmir that hand become a full-fledged liberation struggle after 1989.**

When Zia assumed power in mid-1977, Pakistan was out of the limelight and indeed was considered by some observers to be a political backwater. By the time of Zia's death in 1988, it had, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, become an important actor occupying a central position in the world arena.

Although Zulifqar Ali Bhutto had tried to redirect Pakistan's regional orientation toward West Asia and Zia continued this trend, the nation's geostrategic interests dictated a concentration on South Asia. Pakistan's foreign policy was very much centered on India. Less than two years after Zia's assumption of power, Congress, led by Indira Gandhi, was voted out of office and replaced by the Janata Party, whose foreign minister was Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jana Sangh, long seen as anti-Pakistan. Nonetheless, relations between Pakistan and India may have reached their most cordial level during the almost three years Janata was in power. Vajpayee visited Pakistan in February 1978. There were exchanges on many issues, and agreements were signed on trade, cultural exchanges, and communications-but not on such key issues as Kashmir and nuclear development.

The nuclear issue was of critical importance to both Pakistan and India. In 1974 India successfully tested a nuclear device. Bhutto reacted strongly to this test and said Pakistan must develop its own Islamic bomb. Zia thus inherited a pledge that for domestic reasons he could not discard, and he continued the development program. He asked India to agree to several steps to end this potential nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. One of these measures was the simultaneous signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The second step was a joint agreement for inspection of all nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan also proposed a pact between the two countries to allow for mutual inspection of sites. And, finally, Pakistan proposed a South Asian nuclear-free zone. It appeared that Zia was looking for a way to terminate the costly Pakistani program. But in order to sell this idea in Pakistan, he required some concessions from India. Termination would also get him out of difficulties the program was causing with the United States, including the curtailment of aid in 1979. These proposals were still on the table in the early 1990s, and were supplemented by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's call for a roundtable discussion among Pakistan, India, the United States, Russia, and United State on nuclear weapons in South Asia. Not all relations within South Asia were negative. President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh proposed an organization for South Asian cooperation. Pakistan was at first reluctant, fearing Indian domination, but eventually agreed to join the group, along with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formally inaugurated at a summit meeting in Dhaka in 1985. There have been some positive steps toward cooperation, and regular rotating summits are held, although often with some delays.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India (1984-89) came to Islamabad in 1988 to attend a SAARC summit, the first visit of an Indian prime minister since 1960, when Nehru visited to sign the Indus Waters Treaty. Zia



stopped briefly in New Delhi in December 1985 and in February 1987 visited again, having invited himself to see a cricket match between the two countries. Zia's estimation was that he and Rajiv could meet quite cordially but could not agree on substantive issues.

Active and potential conflict continued to be a constant factor in Pakistan's relations with India. The dispute over the precise demarcation of the Line of Control in Kashmir at the Siachen Glacier heated up periodically and over time caused substantial casualties on both sides because of numerous small skirmishes and the extreme cold in the remote area. Also, in the 1986-87 winter the Indian army conducted Operation Brass Tacks, maneuvers close to the Pakistan border, and Pakistan mobilized its forces. However, the dangerous situation was defused, and no hostilities took place. India accused Pakistan of aiding Sikh insurgents in India's state of Punjab. Pakistan denied this accusation, but some people thought that Operation Brass Tacks might have been a means to strike at alleged bases in Pakistan's Punjab Province. Zia skillfully handled the diplomacy during the period of tension.

Zia continued the process, begun by Bhutto, of opening Pakistan to the West and drew on Pakistan's Islamic, trade, and military ties to the Middle East. Military ties included stationing Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia and training missions in several other countries. Remittances from Pakistanis employed as migrant workers in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf area, increased during the Zia years and became an important factor in Pakistan's foreign-exchange holdings.

Zia played a prominent role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). A Pakistani was secretary general of the OIC, and Zia served on committees concerning the status of Jerusalem and the settlement of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), neither of which were successful. At the 1984 summit at Casablanca, he played a key role in the readmission of Egypt to the OIC and, in doing so, reminded his fellow heads of government that the organization was one for the entire Muslim community and not only for Arab states.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, under its new leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, was reassessing its role in Afghanistan. Indirect proximity negotiations in Geneva under the auspices of the UN were going on between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the United States and the Soviet Union as observers. In April 1988, a series of agreements were signed among the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces by mid-February 1989. The withdrawal was completed on time.

Throughout the years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, relations between the United States and Pakistan were best characterized by close cooperation. Still, United States policy makers became increasingly concerned that Zia and his associates- -most notably, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, then head of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence-appeared to give preferential treatment to the Islamic fundamentalists, especially mujahidin leader Gulbaddin Hikmatyar. Other disagreements persisted, particularly over the failure of the Zia regime to convert to representative government. Documented Pakistani violations of human rights were another major issue; Pakistani involvement in narcotics trafficking was yet another. But the issue that after Zia's death led to another cutoff of aid was Pakistan's persistent drive toward nuclear development.



The event of the Zia period brought Pakistan to a leading position in world affairs. However, Pakistan's new visibility was closely connected to the supportive role it played for the anti Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan-and this deceased when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Pakistan faced some major domestic problems-mounting ethnic and sectarian strife as well as widespread civil disorder. Pakistan will need to address these problems as it strives to improve its international standing as a maturing democratic nation and one aspiring to be the industrial and technological leader of the Muslim world.

